0012 - Release trust: Ed25519 manifests, delegated platform signing
Status: Accepted (2026-11-17)
Context
Phase 2 needs two different trust problems solved:
- OS code signing: macOS codesign/notarization and Windows Authenticode.
tauri-bundleralready drives these platform tools and exposes the settings/environment hooks (ADR 0011). - Update authenticity: a client must reject a manifest or artifact that was tampered with. Auro owns this format; Tauri's manifest shape is not Auro's contract.
Options for update authenticity:
- Reuse minisign/Tauri signature files. Rejected as the only contract: it ties Auro's manifest format to a third-party CLI and its key handling.
- HMAC with a shared secret. Rejected: a client that can verify can also forge.
- Ed25519 detached signatures over a canonical JSON payload. Chosen.
- Platform store signatures only. Rejected: they do not cover a cross-platform update manifest.
Decision
auro-signprovides Ed25519 keys, detached signatures and SHA-256 file hashes. Secret keys are 32-byte base64 seeds in a 0600 text file; public keys and signatures are base64. Verification is strict (malleable signatures rejected).[bundle.macos]and[bundle.windows]map signing inputs ontotauri-bundler; Auro does not invokecodesign/signtoolitself. Notarization credentials stay in the environment.auro-updatedefines manifest format v1. The signature covers the manifest payload excluding the signature field; size and SHA-256 cover the artifact. The client format is Auro's, independent of Tauri's updater.- Auro never stores signing secrets in the repository. Unsigned bundles remain valid build outputs; signing is a configured capability, not a hard failure.
- The updater runtime (download/apply/rollback/deltas/rollout) is explicitly not part of this decision; this ADR covers the trust format and key mechanics.
Consequences
Easier
- A small, auditable signature format with no new service dependency.
- Platform signing reuses the bundler and its CI/credential conventions.
- Tests can exercise key/signature/manifest behavior without certificates.
Harder
- Key distribution, rotation and revocation still need a client/trust contract.
- Losing a secret key means losing the ability to publish updates accepted by clients pinned to its public key; backup/HSM policy is operational work.
- Platform signing/notarization still requires certificates and environment secrets; the unsigned smoke tests do not prove a signed release.
- The manifest is not yet consumed by a runtime updater, so the end-to-end update path is unproven.
Forbidden
- Signing keys or certificates in the repository, test fixtures or logs.
- Presenting an unsigned artifact as signed/notarized.
- Changing manifest field names/order without a format bump and migration.
Revisit when
- The runtime updater and rollback contract are specified.
- Key rotation/revocation or an HSM/keychain-backed signer is needed.
- Deltas or staged rollout change the manifest shape.