0003 - Capabilities at the real boundary
Status: Accepted
Context
Tauri's capability system exists because a web page is untrusted code sharing a process with
privileged commands. Auro's first-party frontend is Rust compiled into the app: calling
std::fs::write is not a privilege escalation, it is the app doing its job.
Copying Tauri's model wholesale would produce a permission system with no adversary, which trains users to click "allow" and reviewers to ignore the manifest.
The genuine runtime boundaries are narrower: third-party plugin code, untrusted content, and the future webview escape hatch.
Decision
Capabilities guard plugins, content, and the webview escape hatch - not first-party app code.
Grants are deny-by-default, declared in a manifest with scopes (fs, net, shell, clipboard,
notification, keychain), compiled into the host, and checked at the call site that performs the
effect.
Consequences
Easier
- The permission surface is small enough to audit and to document honestly.
- Compile-time type safety covers what a runtime permission model would otherwise paper over.
- Plugin authors get a precise denial (scope, subject, pattern) instead of a generic refusal.
Harder
- The security story depends on the plugin host being correct, so it needs its own threat model and tests.
- Users will ask "why can't I grant the app access to X"; the answer is "it is your code, it already has it", which must be explained rather than implied.
- In-process plugins (
cdylib) share the address space, so a capability check cannot contain a malicious library. Defaulting to out-of-process is a consequence, not a preference.
Forbidden
- Adding a capability for something first-party code can do directly.
- A global allow-all mode that ships enabled.
- Treating an in-process plugin as sandboxed.